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Post-election audits use the discrepancy between machine counts
and a hand tally of votes in a random sample of precincts to infer
whether error affected the electoral outcome. The maximum relative
overstatement of pairwise margins (MRO) quantifies that discrep-
ancy. The electoral outcome a full hand tally shows must agree with
the apparent outcome if the MRO is less than 1. This condition is
sharper than previous ones when there are more than two candidates
or when voters may vote for more than one candidate. For the 2006
U.S. Senate race in Minnesota, a test using MRO gives a P -value of
4.05% for the hypothesis that a full hand tally would find a different
winner, less than half the value Stark [Ann. Appl. Statist. 2 (2008)
550–581] finds.
1. Maximum relative overstatement of pairwise margins. For a candi-
date other than an apparent winner to be a real winner of an election,
error that hurts that candidate or helps an apparent winner must exceed
that apparent winner’s margin of victory over that candidate. The max-
imum relative overstatement of pairwise margins (MRO) takes that into
account; previous measures compare errors with the margin of victory over
the runner-up alone.
Consider a contest withK candidates, 1, . . . ,K, andN precincts, 1, . . . ,N .
Each voter may vote for up to f candidates. The f candidates who appar-
ently won are those in Kw. Those who apparently lost are in Kℓ. The appar-
ent vote for candidate k in precinct p is vkp. The apparent vote for candidate
k is Vk ≡
∑N
p=1 vkp. The apparent margin of candidate w over candidate ℓ is
Vwℓ ≡ Vw−Vℓ. For w ∈Kw and ℓ ∈Kℓ, Vwℓ > 0: the apparent winners are the
f candidates with strictly positive apparent margins over the other K − f .
Actual, as a modifier of vote, margin, winner or electoral outcome, means
what a full hand tally would show. The actual vote for candidate k in
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precinct p is akp. The actual vote for candidate k is Ak ≡
∑N
p=1 akp. The
actual margin of candidate w over candidate ℓ is Awℓ ≡ Aw −Aℓ. The ap-
parent winners are the actual winners if
min
w∈Kw,ℓ∈Kℓ
Awℓ > 0.(1)
Define
epwℓ ≡
(vwp − vℓp)− (awp − aℓp)
Vwℓ
.(2)
For the apparent and actual electoral outcomes to differ, there must exist
w ∈ Kw and ℓ ∈ Kℓ for which
∑N
p=1 epwℓ ≥ 1. The maximum relative over-
statement of pairwise margins (MRO) in precinct p is
ep ≡ max
w∈Kw,ℓ∈Kℓ
epwℓ.(3)
Now
max
w∈Kw,ℓ∈Kℓ
N∑
p=1
epwℓ ≤
N∑
p=1
max
w∈Kw,ℓ∈Kℓ
epwℓ =
N∑
p=1
ep.(4)
The sum on the right is the maximum relative overstatement of pairwise
margins (MRO). If the apparent and actual electoral outcomes differ,
∑N
p=1 ep ≥
1. When K = 2 and f = 1, this is equivalent to the condition Stark (2008)
tests. But for K > 2 or f > 1, this condition can be much sharper.
Suppose the number of valid ballots cast in precinct p is at most bp.
Clearly, awp ≥ 0 and aℓp ≤ bp. Hence, epwℓ ≤ (vwp − vℓp + bp)/Vwℓ, and so
ep ≤ max
w∈Kw,ℓ∈Kℓ
vwp − vℓp + bp
Vwℓ
≡ up.(5)
Let {wp(·)}
N
p=1 be monotonic functions. Stark’s (2008) method can test the
hypothesis that
∑N
p=1 ep ≥ 1 given the constraint ep ≤ up using the maximum
observed value of wp(ep) as the test statistic: substitute M = 1 and the
definitions of u and ep given here.
2. The 2006 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota. Table 1 lists the vote totals
for the 2006 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota. The apparent winner was Amy
Klobuchar.1 Minnesota elections law S.F. 2743 (2006) requires that counties
with fewer than 50,000 registered voters audit at least two precincts chosen
at random; that counties with between 50,000 and 100,000 registered voters
1See www.sos.state.mn.us/docs/2006_General_Results.XLS,
electionresults.sos.state.mn.us/2006 1107/ElecRslts.asp?M=S&Races=0102, and
www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=544.
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Table 1
Summary of 2006 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota
Voters Undervotes Fitzgerald Kennedy Klobuchar Cavlan Powers Write-ins
& invalid (Indep) (Repub) (Democ/Farm/ (Green) (Constit)
ballots Labor)
2,217,818 15,099 71,194 835,653 1,278,849 10,714 5,408 901
Vwℓ N/A 1,207,655 443,196 N/A 1,268,135 1,273,441 1,277,948
audit at least three; and that counties with more than 100,000 registered
voters audit at least four. At least one precinct audited in each county
must have 150 or more votes. Minnesota has 4,123 precincts in 87 counties.
202 precincts were audited after the 2006 election. Several counties audited
more than the legal minimum.
Following Stark (2008), we pool Cavlan, Powers, and the write-in can-
didates to form a pseudo-candidate who apparently lost to Klobuchar by
1,261,773 votes. Thus, K = 4, f = 1 and N = 4,123. The maximum value of
up is 0.0097. The maximum observed value of ep is 4.5× 10
−6. If Klobuchar
actually lost, the MRO in at least 166 precincts must be larger than any in
the sample. In contrast, for the measure of margin overstatement Stark (2008)
uses, only about 130 precincts would need to have values exceeding any in
the sample.2 Thus, it is easier to confirm that the apparent and actual out-
comes agree using the MRO.
We calculate a conservative P -value for the hypothesis that Klobuchar ac-
tually lost by pretending that the sample was drawn with replacement from
all 4,123 precincts, but that only 78 precincts were drawn, as if the popula-
tion were sampled using the minimum sampling fraction among counties.3
For weight functions wp(x) = x, the P -value is the maximum chance that
78 precincts chosen at random with replacement would have ep ≤ 0.0097 if,
among all 4,123 precincts, there were at least 166 with ep > 0.0097. That
value is (4123−166
4123
)78 = 4.05%, roughly half the conservative P -value of 8.22%
Stark (2008) finds.
If 202 precincts were drawn as a simple random sample and the same
discrepancies were observed, the P -value would be about 0.02% using the
MRO. In contrast, Stark (2008) finds a corresponding P -value of about
0.13%.
3. Conclusion. The MRO yields a sharper necessary condition for the
apparent electoral outcome to differ from the outcome a full hand tally
2See Table 5 of Stark (2008).
3See Section 4.2.1 of Stark (2008).
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would show than previous measures of the discrepancy between machine
and hand counts do. An a priori bound for the MRO in a precinct can be
derived from a bound on the number of valid ballots in that precinct. The
testing framework Stark (2008) develops works with MRO if the definitions
of M , u and e are revised, and yields a more powerful test.
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